Iran has so far launched about 600 ballistic missiles from an arsenal of roughly 2,500 it had before the war, according to estimates by the IDF Intelligence Directorate (Aman). However, according to a former senior official in Aman, most of the missiles it still possesses are in storage, and the Revolutionary Guards, who are responsible for managing the campaign, are having difficulty preparing them for launch.

It is also becoming clear that the missiles being launched, as well as those in storage, are liquid-fuel missiles, which require fueling for at least an hour before launch. This time allows the air forces of Israel and the United States to attempt to locate and destroy them through airstrikes. Iran had developed solid-fuel missile capabilities years ago, which significantly shorten launch preparation time, but according to Israeli security sources, these capabilities were destroyed in the previous war in June 2025.

Iran’s number of launchers has also been heavily damaged during the 13 days of the current campaign, yet Iran still demonstrates the ability to launch several missiles—between two and five in each barrage, several times a day. According to another source, Iran still has between 100 and 200 launchers.

“What matters more than counting launchers and missiles is their operational doctrine,” the former official told me “They are managing a munitions economy. They fire a few missiles, and that’s enough for them. Their goal is to survive, and wear us down. Hitting high-value targets or causing major damage interests them less now. In effect, they are saying: you won’t sleep at night, and during the day you’ll run to shelters.”

Incidentally, it is worth noting that contrary to some reports, the missiles Iran launches toward the Gulf states are not ballistic missiles but short-range missiles, which allows them to be more accurate and cause greater damage. This is one reason the United Arab Emirates has apparently been targeted with more missiles than Israel. According to the source, “Iran initially tried to strike targets there, among other things to blind American radar and communications systems, but later shifted to firing mainly to cause damage.”

In recent days there have also been increasing reports in Iran of attacks, mainly by drones against checkpoints set up by Basij militia members in the streets of Tehran, to monitor the population and prevent protests. Iranian media accuse the Mossad of being behind the attacks. If this is correct, it appears the Mossad - whose role has hardly been mentioned in Israeli statements during this war - has returned to a modus operandi, that proved effective in the previous war.

These operations are attributed mainly to agents from a kind of “foreign legion” recruited by the Mossad. They are using equipment that was smuggled into the country and prepositioned to be activated, when decided. Assuming the Mossad is indeed active again in Iran, the purpose of attacking Basij personnel is to create chaos, deter the militia from harming civilians, and perhaps encourage parts of the Iranian public to restart the protest.

I also spoke with another former senior Aman official, previously in Unit 8200. His analyses and assessments are among the clearer and more measured voices amid the endless chatter in the public discourse in general and on television channels in particular.

In his view, Israel can and should stop the war.

“Iran is being hit with severe blows, but the Israeli public and the IDF are also exhausted. Our leadership and Trump should declare victory, announce that all objectives have been achieved, and cease fire. Just end the war that way. No negotiations, no deal, and no lifting of sanctions. Simply let the regime collapse into itself.”

This is certainly an original idea that few dare to present to the Israeli public. He emphasizes that the new leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, lacks experience in managing large systems.

“He focused on financial matters and mainly dealt with managing the enormous family wealth that accumulated. Therefore, in my opinion, his attention in the coming period will be directed toward preserving the Islamic Revolution. He knows Iran has no chance in a confrontation with Israel and the United States. He also understands that his country’s nuclear project has suffered very painful blows.”

Therefore, the official does not rule out the possibility that the new supreme leader might say to himself and his aides: “Either way, I hardly have any nuclear capability left, so I might sacrifice what little remains to the United States in exchange for a deal and the lifting of sanctions.”

Perhaps a sign of this is that more than confronting Israel directly, Iran seems to be focusing on damaging oil flows and disrupting the global economy.

“What we are seeing now is an oil war. The Iranians know the United States is very sensitive to this issue.”

Moreover, in his assessment the new leader is not bound by old commitments. “He has fewer inhibitions. On the other hand, he and the Revolutionary Guards have a lot to lose.”

British media reported today that the younger Khamenei allegedly lost one of his legs in an Israeli strike and is in a coma. However, these reports rely on anonymous sources and lack confirmation from more reliable ones. In any case, Iranian media themselves admitted that Mojtaba Khamenei was injured in the war.

The official notes that during the first three days there may indeed have been a communications breakdown, and therefore the Revolutionary Guards may have acted independently according to a pre-prepared plan. Under that plan, if the central government struggles to function, provincial commanders — Iran is divided into 31 provinces — have authority to act on their own.

In Iran this is called the “four-tier hierarchy.” For every commander who is killed, a replacement is pre-designated, as well as a replacement for the replacement, and so on. In the first days, he said, this seemed to be the case when the Iranian response was incoherent and sporadic.

“It looked as if they had command-and-control problems. But I think that phase has passed, and today there is leadership in the country that was prepared in advance, even if the fate of the new supreme leader remains unclear.”

“One must not forget that Iran is a state with institutions and a civil society, not just the Revolutionary Guards, despite their dominance. Unfortunately, here in Israel we think of Iran as a nuclear program that happens to have a country.”

This article was published in Hebrew on March 12, 2026