In the 1970s, Lesotho was a small enclave surrounded by the apartheid state of South Africa. With no natural resources, it was considered one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries on the continent, and a significant portion of the population was forced to work as manual laborers in neighboring South Africa, especially in the mines. Between 1970 and 1989, Lesotho was ruled by dictatorial regimes, first a civilian dictator and then a military dictator.
Despite all this, Lesotho became one of the most important countries for the State of Israel on the African continent, as it was one of the five countries that did not sever diplomatic relations with it following the Yom Kippur War (1973).
Foreign Ministry documents in the state archives that were opened to the public in recent months reveal that the price for not severing diplomatic relations was Israel's assistance in the internal suppression of the opposition and the underground movement. The documents provide an "X-ray" of the State of Israel's system of considerations in its relations with dictatorships.
After gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1966, Lesotho was ruled by the Basotho National Party (BNP), and the Prime Minister was Leabua Jonathan. In 1970, the country held its first elections, but in response to the victory of the opposition party, Jonathan canceled the elections, declared a state of emergency and a one-party regime, dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, banned opposition political activity, and arrested opposition leaders. Until the military coup that ousted him in 1986, Jonathan's regime was characterized by chaos and severe internal repression. Opposition and the underground movement activists were abducted, tortured, and brutally murdered.
Until the wave of severing relations after the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Foreign Ministry opposed providing security assistance to Jonathan's dictatorial regime. This was with the exception of "Gadna" (preparation for military service) training for youths, which began as early as the 1960s.
For example, in a telegram dated November 17, 1972, sent to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by Pinchas Gonen, the non-resident ambassador to Lesotho (Gonen was based in Mbabane, the capital of Swaziland, now called Eswatini). Gonen recommended not sending a permanent security advisor to the country in light of the "deteriorating internal situation."
In another telegram, sent on August 7, 1973, by Leah Sidis, the Director of the Africa Department at the Foreign Ministry, to Ambassador Gonen, Sidis rejected another request from Lesotho for training in Israel of "6-7 security personnel for internal problems," on the grounds that "there is no point in dealing with this issue, when it is clear that the goal is to train people against domestic opposition."
In a review prepared by the Foreign Ministry on November 25, 1973, it was explained that although "a normal and friendly relationship exists with Lesotho and Lesotho generally takes a position favorable to Israel in the international arena," Israel refuses to provide assistance to Lesotho security service. It was explained that "entering this delicate area could entangle us in their difficult internal problems, something that it is important today that we avoid in this country."
A transformation in security relations
But then, caution was thrown to the wind. The change in Israeli attitude occurred after the Yom Kippur War, following Lesotho's decision not to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. In a telegram sent on May 8, 1974, by Ambassador Gonen to the Foreign Ministry, he reported that he had been asked to "come to Lesotho urgently for a meeting with the Prime Minister."
Prime Minister Jonathan told Ambassador Gonen that "he is under heavy pressure to discuss the continuation of diplomatic relations with Israel on the grounds that Lesotho has not received adequate compensation for its friendship." According to Jonathan, "Lesotho's political position on Middle East issues has led to its political isolation on the continent," and in order to continue relations, he demanded Israel's agreement to assist him in "training personnel for the internal security service" by sending Israeli advisors to Lesotho and also holding training in Israel. In addition, Jonathan demanded assistance in training and advising "the mobile police, which is a paramilitary force."
Ambassador Gonen wrote that he feared that Lesotho would sever relations with Israel "to the extent that it becomes convinced that we are not prepared to comply with its requests." In a telegram sent on June 27, 1974, by Ambassador Gonen to the Director Sidis, Gonen reported that he had met again with Prime Minister Jonathan and conveyed to him "our agreement to train four people in internal security matters." Jonathan responded that "after our prolonged refusal, our agreement constitutes the opening of a new page in friendly relations."
In a telegram sent on September 2, 1974, by Ambassador Gonen to Director Sidis, Gonen reported that Lesotho had requested that the training in Israel include counterinsurgency, surveillance, and identification techniques. On November 27, 1974, the Foreign Ministry authorized Ambassador Gonen to inform Jonathan that Israel had agreed to add a fifth trainee in Israel.
In a telegram sent on May 23, 1974, by Director Sidis to Ambassador Gonen, Sidis explained to him the circumstances of the "transformation" in the Foreign Ministry's position. According to Sidis, until then Israel had not wanted to provide security assistance to Lesotho due to "our unwillingness to be involved in Lesotho's internal affairs. For your information, the Prime Minister only needs security assistance for these needs. The internal problems in this country are complicated. There are vibrant and active opposition parties there that benefit from outside assistance and enjoy broad public support. Monitoring their activities and sometimes even the need for repression require constant supervision and policing." According to Sidis, it was decided to grant the request to train in Israel, "in order to withstand the pressures that the Jonathan regime has been exerting on us for a long time."
The change in position occurred even though the Israeli Foreign Ministry was well aware of what was happening in Lesotho: Ambassador Gonen was familiar with the methods of repression and in a telegram he sent to Director Sidis on January 22, 1974, Gonen reported to her that in response to the opposition uprising, "this time a state of emergency was not declared and the approach is completely different from that of 1970, when Jonathan reacted with great anxiety. The method this time is the physical elimination of opponents [...] According to the officers and pilots who fly the mobile police forces to the mountainous areas, about 100 people have been eliminated so far. No prisoners are being taken."
In a telegram dated October 3, 1974, that Ambassador Gonen sent to Director Sidis, Gonen reported that the appointment of Jonathan's deputy as head of internal security issues "has resulted in the efficient operation of the police, which has so far suppressed any budding opposition." In another telegram that Director Sidis sent to Ambassador Gonen on April 18, 1975, Sidis reported to him that the opposition in Lesotho had submitted to the UN a document that "expounds in detail the methods of repression of the Jonathan regime and asks the Commission on Human Rights to act to rectify the situation."
Thus, it happened that despite the information about the severe repression in Lesotho, the training program in Israel was put into action. In a telegram dated April 27, 1975, sent by the Director of the Training Department at the Foreign Ministry, Yehudi Kinar, to Ambassador Gonen, Kinar reported that the delegation from Lesotho had been received at Ben Gurion Airport by representatives of the police and the Mossad and had been taken for training over the next three months.
As described, Israel knew that the "mobile police" were physically eliminating opposition and underground activists. Nevertheless, in a telegram sent on January 20, 1981, by Ambassador to Lesotho, Emmanuel Gelber, to Director of the Africa Department, Avi Primor, Gelber reported that Jonathan's regime was based on the use of the "mobile police unit" and that Jonathan was "now purchasing equipment for it through Uri Lubrani," who had previously served as ambassador to countries important to Israel such as Iran, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Ambassador Gelber explained that this was "undoubtedly for the benefit of the military industries in Israel at this time" and that "the supply of the equipment is linked to the sending of trainers for operating it. Needless to say, we have an interest in the proper maintenance of the equipment."
In a telegram sent on March 3, 1982, by Ambassador Gelber to Director Primor he reported that he had met with the Minister of Economic Planning in the Prime Minister's Office in Lesotho, who requested that Israeli officers be sent for training in Lesotho, explaining that "as a small country, they are unable to maintain a large army and must be content with a small, mobile, and efficient force."
In a telegram that Ambassador Gelber sent to Director Primor on April 13, 1982, Gelber reported that two IDF officers had indeed been sent to Lesotho. In another telegram that Gelber sent on September 15 of that year, he reported that the training provided by the two officers had resulted in "a significant increase in the performance of their army, and this was reflected in clashes with the underground." In a telegram that Ambassador Gelber sent to Director Primor on November 8, 1982, Gelber reported that he had met with the Foreign Minister of Lesotho and informed him of the establishment of the State Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Sabra and Shatila massacre, while Lesotho Foreign Minister requested to receive as a gift the weapons looted by Israel in Lebanon.
According to a telegram dated January 11, 1983, that Ambassador Gelber sent to Primor, Gelber reported that in a meeting with Prime Minister Jonathan, the latter explained to him that he was seeking to purchase weapons from Israel "not directed against South Africa but for internal security purposes," expressed "great appreciation for the work of the two officers," and also requested Israel to send to Lesotho "an intelligence officer to conduct a survey of the state of their intelligence and security services."
Prime Minister Jonathan revealed to Ambassador Gelber that he was in talks with a private company based in Johannesburg for the purpose of purchasing anti-aircraft guns and Galil rifles from Israel. In response, Ambassador Gelber told him that the Israeli Foreign Ministry was considering "the aspect of diplomatic relations with the purchasing countries in its consideration of approving the sale of arms. I expressed our dissatisfaction with their votes." According to a January 12, 1983, telegram that Ambassador Gelber sent to Director Primor, Gelber recommended that Jonathan's requests be granted on the grounds that "the field of security assistance in its broadest sense is currently the main and most significant means of improving relations with Lesotho."
According to a February 1, 1983, telegram sent by Ambassador Gelber to the Foreign Ministry, the intelligence survey was necessary for Jonathan in view of "the internal security situation, the activity of the opposition and the underground, and to this is added the internal unrest fueled by students, the churches and other discontented elements." According to a May 4, 1983, telegram sent by Ambassador Gelber to the Foreign Ministry, Israel decided to respond positively to the request to conduct an intelligence survey for Jonathan regime, and the Lesotho Foreign Minister thanked him for it.
Former senior officers, state-sponsored arms dealers
On January 15, 1986, military forces in Lesotho surrounded the Prime Minister's Office and the headquarters of the ruling party and carried out a military coup, with the support of the apartheid regime in South Africa. A military junta was established in Lesotho, all political activity was banned, and security forces raided the homes of political activists, arrested them, and in some cases murdered them.
The military coup led to the expansion of internal repression in the country and a new chapter in security relations with Israel. On April 7, 1986, the ambassador to Lesotho, Shlomo Dayan, sent a telegram to the Foreign Ministry. Dayan reported that he had met with the head of the junta, General Justin Lekhanya, who "received me with extreme warmth" and asked to learn from Israel on military matters.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing internal crisis, impoverished Lesotho, devoid of external enemies, purchased military equipment. Former Israeli officials who became businessmen benefited from this. Among them was Maj. Gen. (res.) Yanush Ben-Gal, who was eulogized in Haaretz after his death at the age of 80 in February 2016, as "one of the most respected and courageous commanders in the history of the IDF, to whom a significant part is attributed in Israel's victory over Syria in the Yom Kippur War."
In a telegram dated July 2, 1986, sent by Ambassador Shlomo Dayan to the Foreign Ministry, he reported that he had met with Ben-Gal and that the latter had informed him that the junta in Lesotho was stable. Ben-Gal said that he had asked the head of the intelligence department of the apartheid regime in South Africa not to put excessive pressure on the junta to close the Soviet embassy and expel the ANC (African National Congress) members who were in Lesotho, so as not to undermine the junta's status.
Ben-Gal also said that "military officials in South Africa have no objection to his connections in Lesotho. On the contrary, they prefer that a party familiar to them lend a hand to the current regime. A deal was recently reached with Soltam for the supply of mortars. Ben-Gal is also to conduct a survey of the weapons and ammunition stockpiles in the Lesotho army and provide advice on the necessary equipment in the near future." Ben-Gal requested the Foreign Ministry's assistance in financing the studies and stay in Israel of the daughter of General Lekhanya.
In a telegram dated November 30, 1986, sent by the Legal Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Robbie Sabel, to the Director General of the Ministry, he gave his opinion on Ben-Gal's request to be appointed as Lesotho's diplomatic representative in Israel. In his opinion, "it should not be agreed that an Israeli citizen engaged in trade would serve as a foreign diplomat in Israel and enjoy any diplomatic immunity."
Although the arms deals with Lesotho were brokered by private Israeli businessmen, the military junta wanted "official Israel" to give its stamp of approval to the deals. For example, in a telegram sent on December 14, 1986, by Ambassador Dayan to the Foreign Ministry, Dayan wrote that he had been summoned by the junta to urgently come to Lesotho to give his blessing to the conclusion of an arms deal. Ambassador Dayan asked for the Foreign Ministry's position, "whether the Israeli ambassador should be involved in arms deals, and give an official seal to deals in which he was not involved and whose details he did not know."
According to a telegram sent by Ambassador Dayan to the Foreign Ministry on February 9, 1988, the military junta not only purchased weapons and training from Israel, but also a Boeing 707 aircraft, which was refurbished in Israel by Israel Aerospace Industries and flown to the capital, Maseru, by Israeli pilots. Dayan said that the ceremony to receive the aircraft was attended by most members of the military junta. The aircraft served as the basis for the establishment of Lesotho's national airline, while at the same time the junta established an airport financed by Arab banks.
Correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and a representative of the airline from July 1988 shows that the airline requested to operate a regular flight to Israel, with the aircraft to be flown and maintained by Israeli crews based in Lesotho. These wasteful projects were undertaken at a time when the state treasury was empty and the people of Lesotho were suffering from severe poverty.
These security relations were made possible even though, in a series of telegrams before and after the military coup, Israeli ambassadors to Lesotho repeatedly reported the imprisonment, killing, and exile of opposition and underground activists, and that elements in police and army uniforms were committing armed robberies. After the military coup, the ambassadors also reported how members of the previous regime had been murdered, as well as refugees from South Africa who were hiding in Lesotho.
In a telegram sent by the Director of the Africa Department, Meir Yoffe, to the political advisor in Prime Minister Office, David Granit, on June 7, 1989, Yoffe requested to organize a meeting between a member of the junta in Lesotho who was in charge of the ministries of defense and internal security and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir during his visit to Israel on June 19. Yoffe explained that "he is a staunch and loyal friend of the State of Israel. He has visited the country several times. Most recently in 1986."
The military junta was a diplomatic boon to Israel, which in turn ignored the internal repression and the fact that the arms purchases from it were made instead of providing the residents their basic needs. A review prepared by the Foreign Ministry on June 7, 1989, stated that "Lesotho is one of the most economically backward countries in the world" but that "the new regime is showing a sympathetic attitude towards Israel and some improvement is already evident in Lesotho's votes in the UN on problems that concern us [...] It seems that attitudes towards Israel will continue to be positive as long as the members of the Military Council continue to serve in their positions."
The remaining documents on Lesotho are still classified, but those that have been revealed to the public indicate how far the State of Israel was willing to go to advance its political interests.